Art and Estimation

picture of man looking at art objectsInterpretation in fine art refers to the attribution of meaning to a work. A indicate on which people frequently disagree is whether the artist'south or writer's intention is relevant to the estimation of the work. In the Anglo-American analytic philosophy of art, views nearly interpretation branch into two major camps: intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, with an initial focus on one fine art, namely literature.

The anti-intentionalist maintains that a work's meaning is entirely determined by linguistic and literary conventions, thereby rejecting the relevance of the author's intention. The underlying assumption of this position is that a work enjoys autonomy with respect to pregnant and other aesthetically relevant backdrop. Extra-textual factors, such as the writer's intention, are neither necessary nor sufficient for meaning decision. This early position in the analytic tradition is often called conventionalism because of its stiff accent on convention. Anti-intentionalism gradually went out of favor at the end of the 20th century, merely it has seen a revival in the and then-chosen value-maximizing theory, which recommends that the interpreter seek value-maximizing interpretations constrained by convention and, according to a different version of the theory, past the relevant contextual factors at the time of the work's production.

By contrast, the initial brand of intentionalism—actual intentionalism—holds that interpreters should concern themselves with the author'southward intention, for a work's significant is affected by such intention. There are at least three versions of bodily intentionalism. The absolute version identifies a piece of work's meaning fully with the author's intention, therefore allowing that an author can intend her piece of work to mean whatsoever she wants it to mean. The extreme version acknowledges that the possible meanings a work can sustain have to exist constrained by convention. According to this version, the author's intention picks the right meaning of the work as long as it fits i of the possible meanings; otherwise, the work ends up being meaningless. The moderate version claims that when the writer's intention does not match any of the possible meanings, pregnant is fixed instead past convention and maybe besides context.

A 2d brand of intentionalism, which finds a eye course between bodily intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, is hypothetical intentionalism. Co-ordinate to this position, a work's significant is the advisable audience's best hypothesis about the author's intention based on publicly available data nigh the author and her piece of work at the time of the piece's production. A variation on this position attributes the intention to a hypothetical writer who is postulated by the interpreter and who is constituted past piece of work features. Such authors are sometimes said to exist fictional because they, being purely conceptual, differ decisively from flesh-and-blood authors.

This article elaborates on these theories of interpretation and considers their notable objections. The debate about interpretation covers other art forms in addition to literature. The theories of interpretation are also extended across many of the arts. This wide outlook is assumed throughout the article, although nada said is affected fifty-fifty if a narrow focus on literature is adopted.

Table of Contents

  1. Central Concepts: Intention, Pregnant, and Estimation
  2. Anti-Intentionalism
    1. The Intentional Fallacy
    2. Beardsley'south Speech Act Theory of Literature
    3. Notable Objections and Replies
  3. Value-Maximizing Theory
    1. Overview
    2. Notable Objections and Replies
  4. Actual Intentionalism
    1. Accented Version
    2. Extreme Version
    3. Moderate Version
    4. Objections to Bodily Intentionalism
  5. Hypothetical Intentionalism
    1. Overview
    2. Notable Objections and Replies
  6. Hypothetical Intentionalism and the Hypothetical Artist
    1. Overview
    2. Notable Objections and Replies
  7. Determination
  8. References and Further Reading

1. Primal Concepts: Intention, Meaning, and Interpretation

It is common for u.s.a. to inquire questions nearly works of art due to puzzlement or curiosity. Sometimes we exercise non understand the point of the work. What is the point of, for case, Metamorphosis by Kafka or Duchamp's Fountain? Sometimes there is ambiguity in a work and we want it resolved. For case, is the last sequence of Christopher Nolan'southward film Inception reality or some other dream? Or do ghosts really exist in Henry James's The Turn of the Spiral? Sometimes nosotros make hypotheses most details in a piece of work. For example, does the woman in white in Raphael'south The School of Athens represent Hypatia? Is the conch in William Golding's Lord of the Flies a symbol for civilization and commonwealth?

What these questions have in common is that all of them seek afterwards things that become across what the piece of work literally presents or says. They are all concerned with the implicit contents of the work or, for simplicity, with the meanings of a work. A distinction can be fatigued between ii kinds of significant in terms of scope. Meaning can be global in the sense that it concerns the work's theme, thesis, or point. For example, an audition first encountering Duchamp's Fountain would want to know Duchamp'south point in producing this readymade or, put otherwise, what the work as a whole is made to convey. The same goes for Kafka'due south Metamorphosis, which contains so baroque a plot every bit to make the reader wonder what the story is all virtually. Pregnant tin as well be local insofar as it is about what a part of a work conveys. Inquiries into the meaning of a particular sequence in Christopher Nolan's film, the woman in Raphael's fresco, or the conch in William Golding'due south Lord of the Flies are directed at only part of the work.

We are said to be interpreting when trying to find out answers to questions about the meaning of a piece of work. In other words, interpretation is the endeavor to attribute work-meaning. Here "attribute" can hateful "recover," which is retrieving something already existing in a work; or information technology can more weakly hateful "impose," which entails ascribing a pregnant to a work without ontologically creating annihilation. Many of the major positions in the debate endorse either the impositional view or the retrieval view.

When an interpretative question arises, a frequent way to deal with it is to resort to the creator's intention. Nosotros may ask the artist to reveal her intention if such an opportunity is available; we may also check what she says almost her piece of work in an interview or autobiography. If we have access to her personal documents such equally diaries or letters, they too will get our interpretative resource. These are all prove of the creative person's intention. When the show is compelling, we accept good reason to believe information technology reveals the artist'due south intention.

Certainly, there are cases in which external evidence of the artist's intention is absent, including when the piece of work is anonymous. This poses no difficulty for philosophers who view appeal to artistic intention as crucial, for they accept that internal evidence—the work itself—is the best evidence of the artist'southward intention. Most of the time, close attention to details of the work will lead u.s. to what the artist intended the work to hateful.

Simply what is intention exactly? Intention is a kind of mental state usually characterized as a design or programme in the artist'southward mind to be realized in her artistic creation. This crude view of intention is sometimes refined into the reductive analysis i will discover in a contemporaneous textbook of philosophy of mind: intention is constituted by conventionalities and desire. Some actual intentionalists explain the nature of intention from a Wittgensteinian perspective: authorial intention is viewed as the purposive structure of the work that can exist discerned by close inspection. This view challenges the supposition that intentions are always individual and logically contained of the piece of work they crusade, which is ofttimes interpreted equally a position held by anti-intentionalists.

A 2005 proposal holds that intentions are executive attitudes toward plans (Livingston). These attitudes are business firm merely defeasible commitments to acting on them. Contra the reductive assay of intention, this view holds that intentions are distinct and real mental states that serve a range of functions irreducible to other mental states.

Clarifying each of these basic terms (pregnant, interpretation, and intention) requires an essay-length treatment that cannot be done here. For current purposes, information technology suffices to introduce the aforesaid views and proposals usually assumed. Bear in listen that for the about part the argue over art interpretation proceeds without consensus on how to define these terms, and clarifications appear only when necessary.

two. Anti-Intentionalism

Anti-intentionalism is considered the outset theory of estimation to emerge in the analytic tradition. It is normally seen as affiliated with the New Criticism motion that was prevalent in the eye of the twentieth century. The position was initially a reaction against biographical criticism, the main idea of which is that the interpreter, to grasp the meaning of a work, needs to study the life of the writer considering the work is seen as reflecting the author's mental world. This arroyo led to people considering the author's biographical data rather than her work. Literary criticism became criticism of biography, not criticism of literary works. Confronting this trend, literary critic William K. Wimsatt and philosopher Monroe C. Beardsley coauthored a seminal paper "The Intentional Fallacy" in 1946, mark the starting point of the intention fence. Beardsley subsequently extended his anti-intentionalist stance across the arts in his awe-inspiring book Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism ([1958] 1981a).

a. The Intentional Fallacy

The principal thought of the intentional fallacy is that appeal to the creative person's intention exterior the work is beguiling, because the work itself is the verdict of what meaning information technology bears. This contention is based on the anti-intentionalist'south ontological assumption about works of art.

This underlying assumption is that a work of art enjoys autonomy with respect to meaning and other aesthetically relevant backdrop. As Beardsley's Principle of Autonomy shows, disquisitional statements will in the cease need to be tested confronting the piece of work itself, not against factors exterior it. To give Beardsley's example, whether a statue symbolizes human destiny depends not on what its maker says merely on our existence able to brand out that theme from the statue on the basis of our cognition of creative conventions: if the statue shows a man bars to a muzzle, nosotros may well conclude that the statue indeed symbolizes human destiny, for by convention the image of confinement fits that alleged theme. The anti-intentionalist principle hence follows: the interpreter should focus on what she can detect in the work itself—the internal evidence—rather than on external evidence, such as the artist's biography, to reveal her intentions.

Anti-intentionalism is sometimes chosen conventionalism because information technology sees convention as necessary and sufficient in determining work-significant. On this view, the artist's intention at best underdetermines pregnant even when operating successfully. This can be seen from the famous argument offered past Wimsatt and Beardsley: either the creative person's intention is successfully realized in the work, or it fails; if the intention is successfully realized in the piece of work, appeal to external evidence of the artist's intention is not necessary (we tin notice the intention from the work); if it fails, such appeal becomes bereft (the intention turns out to be extraneous to the work). The determination is that an appeal to external evidence of the artist'south intention is either unnecessary or insufficient. As the second premise of the argument shows, the artist'southward intention is insufficient in determining meaning for the reason that convention lonely can do the play a joke on. As a event, the overall statement entails the irrelevance of external testify of the artist'due south intention. To think of such prove as relevant commits the intentional fallacy.

There is a second way to formulate the intentional fallacy. Since the artist does non always successfully realize her intention, the inference is invalid from the premise that the artist intended her piece of work to hateful p to the conclusion that the work in question does mean p. Therefore, the term "intentional fallacy" has two layers of pregnant: normatively, it refers to the questionable principle of interpretation that external show of intent should exist appealed to; ontologically, it refers to the fallacious inference from likely intention to piece of work-meaning.

b. Beardsley'due south Speech Deed Theory of Literature

Beardsley at a later point develops an ontology of literature in favor of anti-intentionalism (1981b, 1982). Reviving Plato's imitation theory of art, Beardsley claims that fictional works are substantially imitations of illocutionary acts. Briefly put, illocutionary acts are performed by utterances in particular contexts. For example, when a detective, convinced that someone is the killer, points his finger at that person and utters the judgement "you lot did information technology," the detective is performing the illocutionary act of accusing someone. What illocutionary human action is existence performed is traditionally construed as jointly adamant past the speaker'southward intention to perform that act, the words uttered, and the relevant atmospheric condition in that particular context. Other examples of illocutionary acts include asserting, warning, castigating, request, and the like.

Literary works tin be seen as utterances; that is, texts used in a item context to perform different illocutionary acts by authors. Nonetheless, Beardsley claims that in the case of fictional works in detail, the purported illocutionary force volition always be removed so every bit to make the utterance an faux of that illocutionary act. When an attempted human activity is insufficiently performed, it ends up existence represented or imitated. For case, if I say "please pass me the salt" in my dining room when no one except me is at that place, I stop upwardly representing (imitating) the illocutionary human activity of requesting because in that location is no uptake from the intended audition. Since the illocutionary act in this case is but imitated, information technology qualifies as a fictional act. This is why Beardsley sees fiction equally representation.

Consider the uptake condition in the instance of fictional works. Such works are not addressed to the audience as a talk is: at that place is no concrete context in which the audience can be readily identified. The uttered text hence loses its illocutionary force and ends up existence a representation. Aside from this "address without access," another obtaining condition for a fictional illocutionary human action is the existence of not-referring names and descriptions in a fictional piece of work. If an author writes a poem in which she greets the great detective Sherlock Holmes, this greeting will never obtain, considering the name Sherlock Holmes does not refer to any existing person in the globe. The greeting will simply finish upwards being a representation or a fictional illocution. By parity of reasoning, fictional works end upward being representations of illocutionary acts in that they e'er contain names or descriptions involving events that never accept identify.

Now we must ask: by what benchmark do we determine what illocutionary human activity is represented? Information technology cannot be the speaker or author's intention, because fifty-fifty if a speaker intends to stand for a particular illocutionary act, she might end up representing another. Since the possibility of failed intention always exists, intention would not be an appropriate criterion. Convention is over again invoked to decide the correct illocutionary act being represented. It is true that any practice of representing is intentional at the start in the sense that what is represented is determined past the representer's intention. Nonetheless, one time the connexion between a symbol and what information technology is used to correspond is established, intention is said to be discrete from that connectedness, and deciding the content of a representation becomes a sheer matter of convention.

Since a fictional work is substantially a representation of an insufficiently performed illocutionary act, determining what information technology represents does not require u.s. to go across that incomplete performance, just every bit determining what a mime is imitating does not require the audience to consider anything exterior her performance, such as her intention. What the mime is imitating is completely determined by how we conventionally construe the act existence performed. In a similar style, when because what illocutionary act is represented by a fictional work, the interpreter should rely on internal evidence rather than on external bear witness of authorial intent to construct the illocutionary act beingness represented. If, based on internal information, a story reads similar a castigation of state of war, it is suitably seen as a representation of that illocutionary act. The determination is that the author'due south intention plays no role in fixing the content of a fictional work.

Lastly, it is worth mentioning that Beardsley'due south attitude toward nonfictional works is ambivalent. Obviously, his oral communication act argument applies to fictional works but, and he accepts that nonfictional works can be 18-carat illocutions. This category of works tends to have a more than identifiable audience, who is hence non addressed without access. With illocutions, Beardsley continues to argue for an anti-intentionalist view of significant according to which the utterer's intention does non determine meaning. But his accepting nonfictional works as illocutions opens the door to considerations of external or contextual factors that become against his earlier stance, which is globally anti-intentionalist.

c. Notable Objections and Replies

One immediate business with anti-intentionalism is whether convention lonely tin point to a single meaning (Hirsch, 1967). The common reason why people fence almost interpretation is precisely that the work itself does not offer sufficient evidence to disambiguate pregnant. Very ofttimes a piece of work tin sustain multiple meanings and the problem of choice prompts some people to appeal to the artist's intention. It does not seem plausible to say that i tin assign only a single meaning to works like Ulysses or Picasso's abstruse paintings if one concentrates solely on internal evidence. To this objection, Beardsley (1970) insists that, in nearly cases, appeal to the coherence of the work can eventually leave us with a single correct interpretation.

A 2nd serious objection to anti-intentionalism is the case of irony (Hirsch, 1976, pp. 24–5). It seems reasonable to say that whether a work is ironic depends on if its creator intended it to exist so. For instance, based on internal bear witness, many people took Daniel Defoe's pamphlet The Shortest Way with the Dissenters to be genuinely confronting the Dissenters upon its publication. All the same, the simply ground for saying that the pamphlet is ironic seems to be Defoe's intention. If irony is a crucial component of the work, ignoring information technology would fail to respect the work's identity. Information technology follows that irony cannot exist grounded in internal testify alone. Beardsley's reply (1982, pp. 203–7) is that irony must offering the possibility of understanding. If the artist cannot imagine anyone taking information technology ironically, there would exist no reason to believe the work to be ironic.

However, the problem of irony is merely function of a bigger business concern that challenges the irrelevance of external factors to interpretation. Many factors present at the time of the work's creation seem to play a cardinal function in shaping a work's identity and content. Missing out on these factors would lead us to misidentifying the work (and hence to misinterpreting information technology).

For instance, a work volition not be seen every bit revolutionary unless the interpreter knows something well-nigh the contemporaneous artistic tradition: ignoring the work'due south innovation amounts to accepting that the piece of work can lose its revolutionary character while remaining self-identical. If nosotros meet this character equally identity-relevant, we should then take information technology into consideration in our estimation. The same line of thinking goes for other identity-conferring contextual factors, such as the social-historical conditions and the relations the work bears to contemporaneous or prior works. The present view is thus called ontological contextualism to foreground the ontological claim that the identity and content of a work of art are in function determined by the relations it bears to its context of production.

Contextualism leads to an important distinction between work and text in the instance of literature. In a nutshell: a text is non context-dependent simply a work is. The anti-intentionalist stance thus leads the interpreter to consider texts rather than works considering information technology rejects considerations of external or contextual factors. The same distinction goes for other art forms when we describe a comparing betwixt an artistic production considered in its brute form and in its context of creation. For convenience, the discussion "work" is used throughout with notes on whether contextualism is taken or non.

As a answer to the contextualist objection, it has been argued (Davies, 2005) that Beardsley'south position allows for contextualism. If this is convincing, the contextualist criticism of anti-intentionalism would not exist conclusive.

three. Value-Maximizing Theory

a. Overview

The value-maximizing theory can be viewed as being derived from anti-intentionalism. Its core merits is that the primary aim of fine art interpretation is to offer interpretations that maximize the value of a piece of work. There are at least 2 versions of the maximizing position distinguished by the commitment to contextualism. When the maximizing position is committed to contextualism, the constraint on interpretation volition exist convention plus context (Davies, 2007); otherwise, the constraint volition be convention only, every bit endorsed by anti-intentionalism (Goldman, 2013).

As indicated, the give-and-take "maximize" does not imply monism. That is, the present position does non merits that there tin be but a single mode to maximize the value of a work of art. On the contrary, information technology seems reasonable to assume that in nigh cases the interpreter tin can envisage several readings to bring out the value of the work. For example, Kafka'south Metamorphosis has generated a number of rewarding interpretations, and it is difficult to argue for a single best among them. Equally long as an estimation is revealing or insightful under the relevant interpretative constraints, we may count it as value-maximizing. Such being the case, the value-maximizing theory may be relabelled the "value-enhancing" or "value-satisfying" theory.

Given this pluralist picture, the maximizer, unlike the anti-intentionalist, will demand to have the indeterminacy thesis that convention (and context, if she endorses contextualism) alone does not guarantee the unambiguity of the work. This allows the maximizing position to bypass the challenge posed by said thesis, rendering it a more flexible position than anti-intentionalism in regard to the number of legitimate interpretations.

Encapsulating the maximizing position in a few words: it holds that the primary aim of art estimation is to enhance appreciative satisfaction by identifying interpretations that bring out the value of a work within reasonable limits set by convention (and context).

b. Notable Objections and Replies

The actual intentionalist will maintain that figurative features such every bit irony and allusion must be analysed intentionalistically. The maximizer with contextualist commitment can counter this objection by dealing with intentions more sophisticatedly. If the relevant features are identity conferring, they will exist respected and accepted in estimation. In this case, any interpretation that ignores the intended feature ends up misidentifying the work. But if the relevant features are not identity conferring, more room volition be left for the interpreter to consider them. The intended feature can be ignored if it does non add to the value of the piece of work. By contrast, where such a feature is non intended but can exist put in the work, the interpreter can yet build it into the interpretation if information technology is value enhancing.

The most important objection to the maximizing view has information technology that the present position is in danger of turning a mediocre piece of work into a masterpiece. Ed Wood's pic Plan nine from Outer Space is the almost discussed example. Many people consider this piece of work to be the worst film ever made. However, interpreted from a postmodern perspective as satire—which is presumably a value-enhancing interpretation—would turn it into a classic.

The maximizer with contextualist leanings can reply that the postmodern reading fails to identify the motion picture equally authored past Wood (Davies, 2007, p, 187). Postmodern views were not available in Wood'south time, so it was impossible for the flick to be created as such. Identifying the film as postmodernist amounts to anachronism that disrespects the work's identity. The moral of this example is that the maximizer does non blindly raise the value of a work. Rather, the piece of work to be interpreted needs to be contextualized start to ensure that subsequent attributions of artful value are done in light of the true and fair presentation of the work.

4. Actual Intentionalism

Contra anti-intentionalism, actual intentionalism maintains that the artist'due south intention is relevant to interpretation. The position comes in at least three forms, giving different weights to intention. The absolute version claims that work-meaning is fully determined by the creative person'south intention; the extreme version claims that the work ends upward beingness meaningless when the creative person's intention is incompatible with it; and the moderate version claims that either the artist'southward intention determines meaning or—if this fails—pregnant is determined instead by convention (and context, if contextualism is endorsed).

a. Accented Version

Accented bodily intentionalism claims that a work ways whatever its creator intends it to hateful. Put otherwise, it sees the artist's intention as the necessary and sufficient condition for a work's meaning. This position is oftentimes dubbed Humpty-Dumptyism with reference to the character Humpty-Dumpty in Through the Looking-Glass. This graphic symbol tries to convince Alice that he tin make a word hateful what he chooses it to hateful. This unsettling conclusion is supported by the statement well-nigh intentionless meaning: a mark (or a sequence of marks) cannot have meaning unless it is produced past an agent capable of intentional activities; therefore, meaning is identical to intention.

It seems plausible to abandon the thought that marks on the sand are a poem one time we know they were caused by blow. But this at best proves that intention is the necessary status for something'southward beingness meaningful; it does not prove farther that what something means is what the agent intended it to mean. In other words, the statement about intentionless meaning does a improve chore in showing that intention is an indispensable ingredient for meaningfulness than in showing that intention infallibly determines the meaning conveyed.

b. Extreme Version

To avoid Humpty-Dumptyism, the extreme actual intentionalist rejects the view that the artist's intention infallibly determines piece of work-meaning and accepts the indeterminacy thesis that convention solitary does not guarantee a single axiomatic pregnant to be found in a work. The extreme intentionalist claims further that the pregnant of the work is fixed by the creative person's intention if her intention identifies one of the possible meanings sustained by the work; otherwise, the work ends up existence meaningless (Hirsch, 1967). Better put, the extreme intentionalist sees intention as the necessary rather than sufficient condition for work-meaning.

Aside from the unsatisfactory outcome that a work becomes meaningless when the creative person's intention fails, the nowadays position faces a dilemma when dealing with the example of figurative language (Nathan, in Iseminger (1992)). Accept irony for instance. The get-go horn of the dilemma is as follows: Constrained by linguistic conventions, the range of possible meanings has to include the negation of the literal meaning in order for the intended irony to exist effective. But this results in absolute intentionalism: every expression would be ironic as long every bit the writer intends it to be. Only—this is the 2nd horn—if the range of possible meanings does not include the negation of literal meaning, the expression only becomes meaningless in that there is no appropriate pregnant possible for the author to concretize. It seems that a broader notion of convention is needed to explain figurative language. Just if the farthermost intentionalist makes that move, her intentionalist position volition be undermined, for the writer's intention would be given a less of import part than convention in such cases. Still, this problem does not arise when the bodily intentionalist is committed to contextualism, for in that instance the contextual factors that make the intended irony possible will exist taken into account.

c. Moderate Version

Though there are several dissimilar versions of moderate actual intentionalism, they share the common ground that when the artist'south intention fails, meaning is stock-still instead by convention and context. (Whether all moderate actual intentionalists have context into account is controversial and this article will not dig into this controversy for reasons of space.) That is, when the artist's intention is successful, it determines meaning; otherwise, pregnant is determined by convention plus context (Carroll, 2001; Stecker, 2003; Livingston, 2005).

As seen, an intention is successful then long as it identifies one of the possible meanings sustained by the work fifty-fifty if the meaning identified is less plausible than other candidates. Just what exactly is the interpreter doing when she identifies that meaning? It is reasonable to say that the interpreter does not demand to ascertain all the possible meanings and see if at that place is a fit. Rather, all she needs to do is to see whether the intended meaning can be read in accord with the work. This is why the moderate intentionalist puts the success condition in terms of compatibility: an intention is successful and so long as the intended significant is compatible with the work. The fact that a certain meaning is compatible with the piece of work means that the piece of work tin can sustain it as 1 of its possible meanings.

Unfortunately, the notion of compatibility seems to allow strange cases in which an insignificant intention can determine piece of work-meaning as long as it is not explicitly rejected by the relevant interpretative constraint. For example, if Agatha Christie reveals that Hercule Poirot is actually a smart Martian in disguise, the moderate intentionalist would need to accept it because this proclamation of intention can still exist said to be compatible with the text in the sense that information technology is not rejected by textual evidence. To avoid this bad issue, compatibility needs to exist qualified.

The moderate intentionalist then analyses compatibility in terms of the meshing condition, which refers to a sufficient caste of coherence between the content of the intention and the work's rhetorical patterns. An intention is compatible with the work in the sense that it meshes well with the work. The Martian case will hence exist ruled out by the meshing condition because it does non engage sufficiently with the narrative even if it is not explicitly rejected past textual evidence. The meshing condition is a minimal or weak success status in that information technology does not require the intention to mesh with every textual feature. A sufficient amount will do, though the moderate intentionalist admits that the line is non always easy to depict. With this weak standard for success, it can happen that the interpreter is not able to discern the intended meaning in the work before she learns of the artist'south intention.

There is a 2nd kind of success condition which adopts a stronger standard (Stecker, 2003; Davies, 2007, pp. 170–1). This standard for success states that an intention is successful merely in case the intended meaning, amidst the possible meanings sustained by the work, is the one most likely to secure uptake from a well-backgrounded audience (with contextual knowledge and all). For instance, if a work of art, inside the limits set past convention and context, affords interpretations x, y, and z, and x is more than readily discerned than the other two by the appropriate audience, then 10 is the meaning of the piece of work.

These accounts of the success condition answer a notable objection to moderate intentionalism. This objection claims that moderate intentionalism faces an epistemic dilemma (Trivedi, 2001). Consider an epistemic question: how do nosotros know whether an intention is successfully realized? Presumably, nosotros figure out piece of work-meaning and the artist'south intention respectively and independently of each other. And and so we compare the ii to run across if there is a fit. Nevertheless, this move is redundant: if nosotros can effigy out piece of work-pregnant independently of bodily intention, why do nosotros need the latter? And if piece of work-meaning cannot exist independently obtained, how tin we know it is a example where intentions are successfully realized and not a instance where intentions failed? It follows that appeal to successful intention results in redundancy or indeterminacy.

The offset horn of the dilemma assumes that piece of work-meaning can be obtained independently of knowledge of successful intention, only this is imitation for moderate intentionalists, for they acknowledge that in many cases the work presents ambiguity that cannot be resolved solely in virtue of internal evidence. The moderate intentionalist rejects the second horn past challenge that they practice not determine the success of an intention by comparing independently obtained work-meaning with the artist's intention (Stecker, 2010, pp. 154–v). Every bit already discussed, moderate intentionalists suggest dissimilar success conditions that do not appeal to the identity between the artist's intention and work-meaning. Moderate intentionalists adopting the weak standard hold that success is defined by the degree of meshing; those who adopt the potent standard maintain that success is defined by the audience'due south ability to grasp the intention. Neither requires the interpreter to place a piece of work'southward significant independently of the creative person'south intention.

d. Objections to Actual Intentionalism

The most normally raised objection is the epistemic worry, which asks: is intention knowable? Information technology seems impossible for ane to really know others' mental states, and the epistemic gap in this respect is thus unbridgeable. Actual intentionalists tend to dismiss this worry as insignificant and maintain that in many contexts (daily conversation or historical investigations) we take no difficulty in discerning another person's intention (Carroll, 2009, pp. 71–v). In that case, why would things of a sudden stand up differently when it comes to art estimation? This is non to say that we succeed on every occasion of interpretation, but that nosotros do so in an amazingly large number of cases. That being said, we should not pass up the appeal to intention solely because of the occasional failure.

Another objection is the publicity paradox (Nathan, 2006). The main idea is this: when someone S conveys something p past a production of an object O for public consumption, there is a second-order intention that the audition need non go across O to reach p; that is, in that location is no need to consult Southward's first-club intentions to understand O. Therefore, when an artist creates a piece of work for public consumption, in that location is a second-club intention that her offset-order intentions not be consulted, otherwise information technology would indicate the failure of the creative person. Actual intentionalism hence leads to the paradoxical claim that we should and should non consult the artist'south intentions.

The actual intentionalist's response (Stecker, 2010, pp. 153–four) is this: not all artists have the second-order intention in question. If this premise is false, then the publicity argument becomes unsound. Even if it were true, the argument would still be invalid, because it confuses the intention that the creative person intends to create something standing alone with the intention that her first-order intention need not be consulted. The paradox will not concord if this distinction is made.

Lastly, many criticisms are directed at a pop statement amidst actual intentionalists: the conversation argument (Carroll, 2001; Jannotta, 2014). An analogy between conversation and art interpretation is drawn, and bodily intentionalists merits that if nosotros accept that art interpretation is a course of conversation, we need to accept actual intentionalism as the right prescriptive account of interpretation, considering the standard goal of an interlocutor in a conversation is to grasp what the speaker intends to say. (This is a premise even anti-intentionalists accept, but they obviously reject the further merits that art interpretation is conversational. Meet Beardsley, 1970, ch.1.) This illustration has been severely criticized (Dickie, 2006; Nathan, 2006; Huddleston, 2012). The greatest disanalogy between conversation and art is that the latter is more like a monologue delivered by the artist rather than an interchange of ideas.

One way to run across the monologue objection is to specify more clearly the office of the conversational involvement. In fact, the actual intentionalist claims that the conversational interest should constrain other interests such as the aesthetic interest. In other words, other interests can be reconciled or piece of work with the conversational interest. Take the case of the hermeneutics of suspicion for example. Hermeneutics of suspicion is a skeptical attitude—frequently heavily politicized—adopted toward the explicit opinion of a work. Interpretations based on the hermeneutics of suspicion have to be constrained by the artist's non-ironic intention in order for them to count as legitimate interpretations. For example, in attributing racist tendencies to Jules Verne's Mysterious Isle, in which the black slave Pecker is portrayed as docile and superstitious, nosotros demand to suppose that the tendencies are not ironic; otherwise, the suspicious reading becomes inappropriate. In this example, the artistic conversation does non terminate up being a monologue, for the suspicious hermeneut listens and understands Verne before responding with the suspicious reading, which is constrained past the conversational interest. A conversational interchange is hence completed.

five. Hypothetical Intentionalism

a. Overview

A compromise betwixt actual intentionalism and anti-intentionalism is hypothetical intentionalism, the core claim of which is that the correct meaning of a work is determined past the best hypothesis about the artist'due south intention made by a selected audience. The aim of interpretation is and then to hypothesize what the artist intended when creating the work from the perspective of the qualified audience (Tolhurst, 1979; Levinson, 1996).

Two points call for attention. First, information technology is hypothesis—not truth—that matters. This means that a hypothesis of the actual intention will never be trumped by knowledge of that very intention. 2nd, the membership of the audition is crucial because it determines the kind of evidence legitimate for the interpreter to utilise.

A 1979 proposal (Tolhurst) suggests that the relevant audition be singled out past the artist's intention, that is, the audience intended to be addressed by the artist. Work-pregnant is thus determined by the intended audience'due south best hypothesis nigh the artist'due south intention. This means that the interpreter will need to equip herself with the relevant behavior and background knowledge of the intended audience in order to brand the all-time hypothesis. Put another way, hypothetical intentionalism focuses on the audience's uptake of an utterance addressed to them. This beingness so, what the audience relies on in comprehending the utterance will be based on what she knows about the utterer on that particular occasion. Following this contextualist line of thinking, the meaning of Jonathan Swift's A Modest Proposal will not be the suggestion that the poor in Ireland might ease their economic pressure past selling their children as nutrient to the rich; rather, given the background cognition of Swift's intended audience, the best hypothesis about the author's intention is that he intended the work to exist a satire that criticizes the heartless attitude toward the poor and Irish policy in general.

Notwithstanding, at that place is a serious problem with the notion of an intended audience. If the intended audience is an extremely small group possessing esoteric knowledge of the creative person, pregnant becomes a private thing, for the work can simply be properly understood in terms of individual information shared between artist and audience, and this results in something close to Humpty-Dumptyism, which is feature of absolute intentionalism.

To cope with this problem, the hypothetical intentionalist replaces the concept of an intended audience with that of an ideal or appropriate audition. Such an audition is not necessarily targeted by the creative person'south intention and is ideal in the sense that its members are familiar with the public facts about the artist and her piece of work. In other words, the ideal audition seeks to anchor the work in its context of creation based on public evidence. This avoids the danger of interpreting the work on the footing of private prove.

The hypothetical intentionalist is aware that in some cases there volition be competing interpretations which are as good. An artful criterion is then introduced to adjudicate betwixt these hypotheses. The aesthetic consideration comes as a necktie breaker: when we reach 2 or more than epistemically all-time hypotheses, the one that makes the work artistically meliorate should win.

Some other notable distinction introduced by hypothetical intentionalism is that between semantic and categorial intention (Levinson, 1996, pp. 188–nine). The kind of intention nosotros have been discussing is semantic: it is the intention by which an artist conveys her bulletin in the work. By contrast, categorial intention is the creative person's intention to categorize her production, either as a work of art, a certain artform (such as Romantic literature), or a detail genre (such as lyric poetry). Categorial intention indirectly affects a work'southward semantic content because it determines how the interpreter conceptualizes the piece of work at the key level. For example, if a text is taken as a grocery list rather than an experimental story, we will interpret it every bit saying nil beyond the named grocery items. For this reason, the creative person's categorial intention should be treated equally amongst the contextual factors relevant to her work's identity. This move is often adopted by theorists endorsing contextualism, such as maximizers or moderate intentionalists.

b. Notable Objections and Replies

Hypothetical intentionalism has received many criticisms and challenges that merit mention. A oft expressed worry is that information technology seems odd to stick to a hypothesis when newly found show proves it to be false (Carroll, 2001, pp. 208–9). If an creative person's private diary is located and reveals that our all-time hypothesis about her intention regarding her work is false, why should we cling to that hypothesis if the newly revealed intention meshes well with the work? Hypothetical intentionalism implausibly implies that warranted assertibility constitutes truth.

The hypothetical intentionalist clarifies her position (Levinson, 2006, p. 308) by maxim that warranted assertibility does not constitute the truth for the utterer's meaning, but it does establish the truth for utterance meaning. The ideal audience's best hypothesis constitutes utterance significant even if it is designed to infer the utterer's meaning.

Another troublesome objection states that hypothetical intentionalism collapses into the value-maximizing theory, for, when making the best hypothesis of what the artist intended, the interpreter inevitably attributes to the artist the intention to produce a piece with the highest degree of artful value that the work can sustain (Davies, 2007, pp. 183–84). That is, the epistemic criterion for determining the best hypothesis is inseparable from the aesthetic benchmark.

In reply, it is claimed that this objection may stem from the impression that an creative person unremarkably aims for the best; even so, this does not imply that she would anticipate and intend the artistically best reading of the piece of work. It follows that it is not necessary that the best reading be what the artist most likely intended even if she could have intended it. The objector replies that, still, the situation in which we have ii epistemically plausible readings while one is junior cannot arise, because we would adopt the inferior reading only when the superior reading is falsified by evidence.

The third objection is that the distinction between public and private bear witness is blurry (Carroll, 2001, p. 212). Is public show published show? Does published data from individual sources count as public? The answer from the hypothetical intentionalist emphasizes that this is not a stardom betwixt published and unpublished information (Levinson, 2006, p. 310). The relevant public context should exist reconstrued as what the artist appears to have wanted the audience to know about the circumstances of the piece of work'south cosmos. This ways that if it appears that the creative person did not want to make certain proclamations of intent known to the audience, so this prove, even if published at a later on point, does not constitute the public context to be considered for interpretation.

Finally, two notable counterexamples to hypothetical intentionalism have been proposed (Stecker, 2010, pp. 159–60). The first counterexample is that W means p but p is not intended past the artist and the audition is justified in believing that p is not intended. In this instance hypothetical intentionalism falsely implies that W does non mean p. For case, it is famously known among readers of Sherlock Holmes adventures that Dr. Watson'south war wound appears in two different locations. On i occasion the wound is said to be on his arm, while on some other information technology is on his thigh. In other words the Holmes story fictionally asserts impossibility regarding Watson'due south wound. But given the realistic style of the Holmes adventures, the best hypothesis of authorial intent in this example would deny that the impossibility is office of the significant of the story, which is apparently simulated.

Withal, the hypothetical intentionalist would not maintain that West means p, because p is not the best hypothesis. She would not merits that the Holmes story fictionally asserts impossibility regarding Watson's wound, for the all-time hypothesis made by the ideal reader would be that Watson has the wound somewhere on his body—his arm or thigh, simply exactly where nosotros do non know. It is a mistake to presuppose that W ways p without following the strictures imposed by hypothetical intentionalism to properly attain p.

The second counterexample to hypothetical intentionalism is the instance where the audience is justified in believing that p is intended by the creative person but in fact West means q; the audience would then falsely conclude that W means p. Again, what Due west means is determined by the ideal audience'due south all-time hypothesis based on convention and context, not by what the work literally asserts. The meaning of the work is the product of a prudent cess of the total evidence bachelor.

6. Hypothetical Intentionalism and the Hypothetical Artist

a. Overview

There is a 2d variety of hypothetical intentionalism that is based on the concept of a hypothetical artist. Generally speaking, it maintains that interpretation is grounded on the intention suitably attributed by the interpreter to a hypothetical or imagined creative person. This version of hypothetical intentionalism is sometimes called fictionalist intentionalism or postulated authorism. The theoretical apparatus of a hypothetical creative person can be traced back to Wayne Booth'due south account of the "implied author," in which he suggests that the critic should focus on the writer we can brand out from the work instead of on the historical author, because there is ofttimes a gap betwixt the two.

Though proponents of the present brand of intentionalism disagree on the number of acceptable interpretations and on what kind of evidence is legitimate, they concur that the interpreter ought to concentrate on the appearance of the work. If it appears, based on internal evidence (and perhaps contextual information if contextualism is endorsed), that the artist intends the piece of work to hateful p, then p is the right estimation of the work. The artist in question is non the historical artist; rather, information technology is an artist postulated by the audience to be responsible for the intention made out from, or implied by, the work. For example, if in that location is an anti-war mental attitude detected in the work, the intention to castigate war should be attributed to the postulated creative person, not to the historical creative person. The motivation behind this move is to maintain piece of work-centered estimation just avert the fallacious reasoning that whatever we discover in the work is intended by the real artist.

Inheriting the spirit of hypothetical intentionalism, fictionalist intentionalism aims to brand interpretation work-based but author-related at the same time. The biggest difference between the two stances is that, as said, fictionalist intentionalism does not entreatment to the actual or real artist, thereby avoiding any criticisms arising from hypothesizing about the existent artist such as that the best hypothesis about the existent artist's intention should exist abandoned when compelling bear witness confronting information technology is obtained.

b. Notable Objections and Replies

The starting time business organization with fictionalist intentionalism is that constructing a historical variant of the actual artist sounds suspiciously like hypothesizing about her (Stecker, 1987). But there is still a departure. "Hypothesizing almost the actual creative person," or more accurately, "hypothesizing the bodily artist's intention," would be a characterization of hypothetical intentionalism rather than fictionalist intentionalism. The latter does not track the actual artist's intention but constructs a virtual one. As shown, fictionalist intentionalism, unlike hypothetical intentionalism, is immune to any criticisms resulting from ignoring the actual creative person'south proclamation of her intention.

A 2nd objection criticizes fictionalist intentionalism for not beingness able to distinguish between dissimilar histories of creative processes for the same textual appearance (Livingston, 2005, pp. 165–69). For example, suppose a work that appears to be produced with a well-conceived scheme did result from that kind of scheme; suppose further that a second work that appears the same actually emerged from an uncontrolled procedure. And so, if nosotros follow the strictures of fictionalist intentionalism, the interpretations we produce for these two works would turn out to exist the same, for based on the aforementioned appearance the hypothetical artists we construct in both cases would be identical. But these ii works take different creative histories and the difference in question seems as well crucial to be ignored.

The objection hither fails to consider the subtlety of reality-dependent appearances (Walton, 2008, ch. 12). For example, suppose the showroom note beside a painting tells united states it was created when the painter got heavily drunkard. Whatsoever well-organized characteristic in the work that appears to effect from conscientious manipulation by the painter might now either look matted or structured in an eerie manner depending on the feature's actual presentation. Compare this scenario to another where a (almost) visually indistinguishable analogue is exhibited in the museum with the exhibit annotation revealing that the painter spent a long period crafting the piece of work. In this second case the audience's perception of the work is non very probable to be the same every bit that in the offset example. This shows how the credible artist account tin can still discriminate between (appearances of) different creative histories of the same artistic presentation.

Finally, there is frequently the qualm that fictionalist intentionalism ends up postulating phantom entities (hypothetical creators) and phantom actions (their intendings). The fictional intentionalist can reply that she is giving descriptions simply of appearances instead of quantifying over hypothetical artists or their deportment.

vii. Determination

From the above discussion nosotros tin discover two major trends in the debate. Kickoff, well-nigh late 20thursday century and 21st century participants are committed to the contextualist ontology of fine art. The relevance of art's historical context, since its offset philosophical appearance in Arthur Danto's 1964 essay "The Artworld," continues to influence analytic theories of art estimation. In that location is no sign of this trend diminishing. In Noël Carroll's 2016 survey commodity on interpretation, the contextualist ground is still assumed.

Second, bodily intentionalism remains the most popular position among all. Many substantial monographs have been written in this century to defend the position (Stecker, 2003; Livingston, 2005; Carroll, 2009; Stock 2017). This intentionalist prevalence probably results from the influence of H. P. Grice's work on the philosophy of language. And again, this tendency, like the contextualist faddy, is still ongoing. And if we run into intentionalism as an umbrella term that encompasses not only actual intentionalism simply also hypothetical intentionalism and probably fictionalist intentionalism, the influence of intentionalism and its related emphasis on the concept of an artist or writer will be even stronger. This presents an interesting contrast with the trend in post-structuralism that tends to downplay authorial presence in theories of interpretation, every bit embodied in the author-is-expressionless thesis championed by Barthes and Foucoult (Lamarque, 2009, pp. 104–15).

8. References and Farther Reading

  • Beardsley, M. C. (1970). The possibility of criticism. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.

  • Contains 4 philosophical essays on literary criticism. The first two are amongst Beardsley'due south most of import contributions to the philsoophy of interpretation.

  • Beardsley, One thousand. C. (1981a). Aesthetics: Problems in the philosophy of criticism (2nd ed.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.

  • A comprehensive volume on philosophical issues across the arts and likewise a powerful statement of anti-intentionalism.

  • Beardsley, 1000. C. (1981b). Fiction as representation. Synthese, 46, 291–313.

  • Presents the voice communication human action theory of literature.

  • Beardsley, M. C. (1982). The artful point of view: Selected essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

  • Contains the essay "Intentions and Interpretations: A Fallacy Revived," in which Beardsley applies his spoken language act theory to the interpretation of fictional works.

  • Booth, W. C. (1983). The rhetoric of fiction (2nd ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

  • Contains the original account of the implied author.

  • Carroll, N. (2001). Across aesthetics: Philosophical essays. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

  • Contains in particular Carroll's chat argument, give-and-take on the hermenutics of suspicion, defence force of moderate intentionalism, and criticism of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Carroll, North. (2009). On criticism. New York, NY: Routledge.

  • An engaging book on artistic evaluation and interpretation.

  • Carroll, N., & Gibson, J. (Eds.). (2016). The Routledge companion to philosophy of literature. New York, NY: Routledge.

  • Anthologizes Carroll'south survey article on the intention contend.

  • Currie, Yard. (1990). The nature of fiction. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Academy Printing.

  • Contains a defense of fictionalist intentionalism.

  • Currie, Thou. (1991). Work and text. Mind, 100, 325–40.

  • Presents how a commitment to contextualism leads to an important distinction between work and text in the case of literature.

  • Danto, A. C. (1964). The artworld. Journal of Philosophy, 61, 571–84.

  • First paper to describe attention to the relevance of a work's context of production.

  • Davies, Southward. (2005). Beardsley and the autonomy of the work of art. Periodical of Aesthetics and Fine art Criticism, 63, 179–83.

  • Argues that Beardsley is actually a contextualist.

  • Davies, S. (2007). Philosophical perspectives on art. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • Part II contains Davies' defense of the maximizing position and criticisms of other positions.

  • Dickie, 1000. (2006). Intentions: Conversations and art. British Periodical of Aesthetics, 46, 71–81.

  • Criticizes Carroll's conversation argument and bodily intentionalism.

  • Goldman, A. H. (2013). Philosophy and the novel. Oxford, England: Oxford Academy Press.

  • Contains a defense of the value-maximizing theory without a contextualist commitment.

  • Hirsch, E. D. (1967). Validity in interpretation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

  • The nigh representative presentation of extreme intentionalism.

  • Hirsch, E. D. (1976). The aims of interpretation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

  • Contains a collection of essays expanding Hirsh's views on interpretation.

  • Huddleston, A. (2012). The chat argument for actual intentionalism. British Periodical of Aesthetics, 52, 241–56.

  • A brilliant criticism of Carroll'southward chat argument.

  • Iseminger, G. (Ed.). (1992). Intention & interpretation. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Printing.

  • A valuable drove of essays featuring Beardsley's business relationship of the work'due south autonomy, Knapp and Michaels' accented intentionalism, Iseminger's farthermost intentionalism, Nathan'due south business relationship of the postulated artist, Levinson's hypothetical intentionalism, and viii other contributions.

  • Jannotta, A. (2014). Estimation and chat: A response to Huddleston. British Periodical of Aesthetics, 54, 371–80.

  • A defense of the conversation argument.

  • Krausz, Grand. (Ed.). (2002). Is there a single correct interpretation? University Park: Pennsylvania State University Printing.

  • Another valuable album on the intention debate, containing in particular Carroll'south defense force of moderate intentionalism, Lamarque's criticism of viewing work-meaning every bit utterance meaning.

  • Lamarque, P. (2009). The philosophy of literature. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

  • The third and the fourth chapters discuss analytic theories of interpretation forth with a critical cess of the author-is-dead claim.

  • Levinson, J. (1996). The pleasance of aesthetics: Philosophical essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

  • The tenth chapter is Levinson'southward revised presentation of hypothetical intentionalism and the distinction between semantic and categorial intention.

  • Levinson, J. (2006). Contemplating art: Essays in aesthetics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • Contains Levinson'south replies to major objections to hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Levinson, J. (2016). Aesthetic pursuits: Essays in philosophy of art. Oxford, England: Oxford University Printing.

  • Contains Levinson's updated defense of hypothetical intentionalism and criticism of Livingston's moderate intentionalism.

  • Livingston, P. (2005). Art and intention: A philosophical study. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • A thorough discussion on intention, literary ontology, and the problem of interpretation, with emphases on defending the meshing condition and on the criticisms of the ii versions of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Nathan, D. O. (1982). Irony and the artist's intentions. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 22, 245–56.

  • Criticizes the notion of an intended audience.

  • Nathan, D. O. (2006). Fine art, meaning, and artist's meaning. In M. Kieran (Ed.), Contemporary debates in aesthetics and the philosophy of art (pp. 282–93). Oxford, England: Blackwell.

  • Presents an business relationship of fictionalist intentionalism, a critique of the conversation statement, and a brief recapitulation of the publicity paradox.

  • Nehamas, A. (1981). The postulated author: Critical monism as a regulative ideal. Critical Inquiry, viii, 133–49.

  • Presents another version of fictionalist intentionalism.

  • Stecker, R. (1987). 'Apparent, Implied, and Postulated Authors', Philosophy and Literature 11, pp 258-71.

  • Criticizes different versions of fictionalist intentionalism

  • Stecker, R. (2003). Interpretation and construction: Fine art, speech, and the law. Oxford, England: Blackwell.

  • A valuable monograph devoted to the intention argue and its related bug such as the ontology of art, incompatible interpretations and the application of theories of art estimation to law. The book defends moderate intentionalism in particular.

  • Stecker, R. (2010). Aesthetics and the philosophy of art: An introduction. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

  • Contains a chapter that presents the disjunctive formulation of moderate intentionalism and the two counterexamples to hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Stecker, R., & Davies, Southward. (2010). The hypothetical intentionalist's dilemma: A reply to Levinson. British Journal of Aesthetics, 50, 307–12.

  • Counterreplies to Levinson's replies to criticisms of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Stock, K. (2017). Only imagine: Fiction, interpretation, and imagination. Oxford, England: Oxford University Printing.

  • Contains a defence force of accented (the author uses the term "farthermost") intentionalism.

  • Tolhurst, Westward. E. (1979). On what a text is and how it means. British Periodical of Aesthetics, 19, 3–14.

  • The founding document of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Trivedi, S. (2001). An epistemic dilemma for bodily intentionalism. British Journal of Aesthetics, 41, pp. 192–206.

  • Presents an epistemic dilemma for bodily intentionalism and defense of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Walton, Thou. L. (2008). Marvelous images: On values and the arts. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • A drove of essays, including "Categories of Fine art," which might have inspired Levinson's formulation of categorial intention; and "Style and the Products and Processes of Art," which is a defence force of fictionalist intentionalism in terms of the notion "apparent artist."

  • Wimsatt, W. K., & Beardsley, One thousand. C. (1946). The intentional fallacy. The Sewanee Review, 54, 468–88.

  • The first thorough presentation of anti-intentionalism, commonly regarded as starting signal of the intention debate.

Author Information

Szu-Yen Lin
E-mail: lsy17@ulive.pccu.edu.tw
Chinese Civilization Academy
Taiwan